Why Christians Should Be Non-Interventionist

By Adam Graham

With the 24-hour news cycle and its almost limitless global reach, it never fails that we hear daily about the newest outbreak of violence or instability somewhere in the world. Word of the latest humanitarian crisis is often front and center on social or mass media, ready to attract our attention and pull at our heart strings. And, just as often, those same stories are used to promote humanitarian or military intervention by this or that government or international agency or alliance.

The principle of non-intervention can be one of the toughest libertarian principles for those outside of the philosophy to adopt or agree with. At times, it goes against a visceral, instinctual desire to see things made right, to see justice done in the world, to see people rescued from misfortune. “We have to do something, don’t we? We can’t just sit by and watch while people suffer.” But this principle is not just a libertarian one. It has roots in American history, especially conservatism and republicanism, and is perfectly consistent with Christianity. And its wisdom, practicality, and pragmatism can be easily seen by working through some of its philosophical underpinnings. Here are just a few reasons why Christians should favor non-intervention.

What About that Moral Impulse?

One of the most obvious and powerful obstacles to adopting a non-interventionist viewpoint when it comes to humanitarian crises or cases of war is man’s moral impulse. We can often feel that, if something can be done, it should be done, and if we have the power to see it done, then we should utilize that power. At root, this is a perfectly normal and valuable instinct and is certainly consistent with, if not evidence of, the deep moral nature that only mankind possesses. So, if that moral impulse is good and right, how is interventionism that is consistent with that impulse not also good and right?

The first philosophical issue to correct in regards to intervention is that we cannot and should not boil these issues down to a simple matter of whether intervening in any given situation may be morally right. We must also temper our moral instincts by what is wise or prudent. This distinction was hammered home to me recently as I was working through a section of J.I. Packer’s classic work “Knowing God”, specifically, his chapter on God’s wisdom. As any theologically sound Christian will aver, God is perfect in His attributes and one of those attributes is wisdom. Therefore, we can say that God is perfectly wise. And, more than that, Packer continues:

“God’s wisdom cannot be frustrated…for it is allied to omnipotence. Power is as much God’s essence as wisdom is. Omniscience governing omnipotence, infinite power ruled by infinite wisdom, is a basic biblical description of the divine character.”

But it was this statement that most stuck out to me: “wisdom is, in fact, the practical side of moral goodness.” As much as morality enters into our discussions regarding the use of force and humanitarian intervention, the quality of wisdom is rarely mentioned. It is easy enough to envision what we would consider an ideal outcome of a given conflict but little thought is often given to whether any actions to be taken are wise. In fact, many might question how an otherwise moral action or outcome could not be wise, as though they are basically synonymous.

Packer also tells us that “wisdom is the power to see, and the inclination to choose, the best and highest goal, together with the surest means of attaining it.”

As Christians, we often pray that God would intervene in difficult situations, in injustice, in oppression, in conflict. And, because God is perfectly wise and perfectly just, it makes sense that, if He were to intervene, it would lead to His desired outcome through the best means possible. So, given our knowledge that we should apply not only our moral instinct but our wisdom and discernment to matters of intervention, we must then ask: just how feasible is the task of wise and moral intervention?

How Sure Can We Be?

Along with the moral instinct that some sort of intervention is required in a given situation, that moral instinct is instructed and tempered by a sense of justice or injustice. In order for us to know what sort of intervention is moral or just, we would first have to fully understand the nature of the current situation, have a clear idea of the best possible outcome of that situation, and have some confidence that the means with which we would use is sure to lead to that outcome.

But how confident can we be in our understanding and our execution of justice?

What we quickly find is that the sheer scale and scope of the sorts of interventions carried out by governments are simply beyond human confidence and cannot possibly hope to succeed in each of these areas. To illustrate this, let us consider the simple case and work upward. Consider, for instance, that you look outside and witness an adult neighbor beating a child. You likely know the neighbor and the child and the situation is fairly clear that there exist very few scenarios in which such treatment would be permissible or warranted. If we were to intervene in this instance, we can be fairly certain that we would be doing so justly; that we would be achieving just ends using just means with few, if any, unforeseen or negative side effects and repercussions.

Now, consider that you witness two of your adult friends fighting. You may know them both equally well in terms of their character and temperament. And, given that you know them personally, you may even accurately guess the nature of or reason for their altercation. If you were to intervene, they may trust you to justly adjudicate the conflict and broker a resolution. However, note that, already, at this small scale, we begin to invite a number of risks. Risks to our personal health, that we might come to harm in preventing further violence, or that we may be subject to other repercussions as part of our actions.

Now, consider that you happen upon a group of adults fighting. Even if we were to have a suspicion as to which group might likely be more culpable in initiating violence, we cannot possibly begin to know for sure which individual or group is more to blame or which group would be likely, in the long run, to behave more morally in the future. And we introduce almost certain harm to ourselves or those associated with us should we choose to intervene.

Now, imagine such a scenario multiplied in complexity thousands of times to entire populations of a nation state, using political and military means and the same problems and risks continue to grow to monumental proportions. We cannot possibly expect to gather enough reliable intelligence or background in order to understand the full extent of the conflict at hand, cannot possibly expect to know with any certainty the likely outcomes of any actions taken, and invite untold risks not only to those carrying out intervention but also to those whom they represent. The further that we extend the scope of these situations, the more intractable the problem becomes.

We are often presented with concise, digestible pictures of conflicts or crises with clear good and evil, black and white portrayals of the actors involved. But this is almost never actually the case. No conflict or crisis involving human beings ever occurs within a vacuum. And these conflicts, upon further investigation, almost always show a spectrum of rights and wrongs committed by all sides with no clear picture of who bears responsibility, what the most just outcome might be, or what means could possibly achieve such an outcome.

The Folly of Central Planning

The American political culture has long had a disposition toward free markets and individual liberty to one degree or another. While this was something of a default state for the 19th century, by contrast, the 20th century has been marked by the advent and adoption of Marxism and Fascism in Europe, with its encroachments on economic and civil liberties, and its gradual spread into the American system. Vast numbers of Americans have opposed this spread of Socialism, or government regulation and control of elements of the economy, while the contemporary push towards adopting more Socialist policies is alive and well.

One of the primary objections to the Socialist program is that of central planning and the problem of knowledge. F. A. Hayek is known for his work on countering the Socialist ideology and one of the main problems he often referred to is the sheer amount of knowledge one would have to account for in order to successfully and efficiently plan an economy from the top down or center out. In his words, that problem is, in reality, so vast that “the mere idea that the planning authority could ever possess a complete inventory of the amounts and qualities of all the different materials and instruments of production of which the manager of a particular plant will know or be able to find out makes the whole proposal a somewhat comic fiction.”

Ludwig Von Mises also wrote extensively regarding the phenomenon of intervention within an economy and that insight, I believe, also carries over to the foreign policy realm. For instance, Mises presciently notes that, “All varieties of (government) interference with the market phenomena not only fail to achieve the ends aimed at by their authors and supporters, but bring about a state of affairs which — from the point of view of the authors’ and advocates’ valuations — is less desirable than the previous state of affairs which they were designed to alter.”

And here lies a striking inconsistency inherent in those who, on the one hand, reject central planning or government intervention in the economy, and on the other, advocate for planning or government intervention in foreign policy.

While Mises was primarily concerned with intervention in the market economy, students of history and international relations will easily see the commonality that these insights share regarding intervention into the affairs of other nations. As complex as a domestic economy can be, the affairs other nation-states must be at least as complex. Each has its own national and ethnic history spanning centuries or even millennia. Each has its own economy that is undoubtedly just as closely tied to its political realities. And, worse, that history, economy, and political reality is likely the complex product of past interventions, the effects of which have still yet to fully play out.

Those who would seek to intervene in economies with Socialism and central planning share much in common with those who would advocate for intervention in international affairs. Both often do so out of a sense of good intention, wanting the best for themselves and those involved and both have a fairly clear idea of the desired outcome. But they also share the same folly; a disproportionate sense of their own ability to achieve any such outcome and a lack of wisdom or prudence available to see that outcome through with the means at hand.

Does It Ever Even Work?

Finally, we should point out that, in the grand scheme of history of humanitarian interventions, the best of intentions and surest means of success repeatedly fail, often with disastrous results. A thorough review of such history would span volumes but a small subset of cases can easily be presented here.

Take, for instance, an example that, at the time, seemed to be a rather simple win for interventionism: the Spanish-American War. Near the end of the 19th century, Spain still possessed colonial holdings including Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. But the native population in Cuba in particular were in the process of fighting for their independence. The desire for a less hostile Cuban neighbor was an obvious positive for Washington at the time and it was decided to aid the Cubans militarily to force out their Spanish overlords. Initially, the US promised to turn Cuban independence over to the Cubans themselves, with the Senate passing the Teller Amendment which promised, “to leave the government and control of the island to its people.” However, in tragic fashion, that mood shifted after Spanish surrender, with the press and prominent politicians shifting US policy and attitudes to one of the “absolute necessity of controlling Cuba for our own defense.” The example of the Spanish-American war is a classic one in which the originally clear and concise goals, where intervention might actually come close to being just, inevitably turn to unjust designs when mixed with power, wealth, and opportunity.

Or, consider the intervention some fifty years later in Iran. When the democratically elected Mohammed Mossadegh rose to power in the early 1950’s, Arab nationalism led him to the ill-fated decision to nationalize the Iranian oil industry, in conflict with British colonial interests. When Britain decided to call on the US to intervene, the American public and many within the government itself was sold the story that Mossadegh was a Communist and could not be allowed to succeed in his plans for Iran. The CIA became involved and successfully replaced Mossadegh with Mohammad Reza Shah, a leader more loyal to western interests. But while the Shah’s rule may have been a boon to the US and Britain, it was an oppressive one for the Iranian people themselves and their disdain ultimately led to the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Thus, we can see that American actions, despite any possible good intentions they may have represented, was at least partly responsible for the very transformation of Iran into an Islamic Republic that so many today would revile.

Or, consider the case of Guatemala. When Guatemala’s second democratically elected president, Jacobo Arbenz came to power, he continued in his predecessor’s footsteps in enacting social reforms in the pattern of European and American reforms. But he also took on the task of enacting land reform which greatly angered many crony political interests, especially that of the United Fruit Company. Instead of admitting the past sins of these political dealings, United Fruit used its plethora of connections inside Washington to once again enact a smear campaign against Arbenz, giving him the familiar Communist label, and worked with the CIA to organize his overthrow. In his place, they installed a military dictator and what followed was a bloody civil war that cost upwards of 200,000 lives. If the goal of an intervention is to somehow preserve or promote life, liberty, and property, how is it possible that Arbenz and the Guatemalan people, attempting to right past wrongs that deprived them of those very things, were ultimately better off after the fact?

The Bottom Line

The fact is that our moral impulse in favoring intervention in the vast majority of cases, however well intentioned, simply cannot overcome fundamental obstacles. The wisdom of such actions, the vast amount of information necessary and planning hurdles to overcome, the maintenance of justice, and the abysmal track record of past intervention; all speak to the simple reality that interventionism, as a political philosophy, is a failed one. Christians everywhere are always called to intercede on the behalf of those who are oppressed, the poor and the downtrodden. But the use of government force will forever be a poor substitute as a means of achieving those ends.

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Why Christians Should Be Non-Interventionist was written by Adam Graham, and originally published by No King King But Christ

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